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ABSTRACT 23 
Next Generation Sequencing technology is now being increasingly applied to study the within and 24 
between host population dynamics of viruses. However, information on avian influenza virus 25 
evolution and transmission during a naturally occurring epidemic is still limited. Here, we use deep 26 
sequencing data obtained from clinical samples collected from five industrial holdings and a 27 
backyard farm infected during the 2013 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H7N7 epidemic 28 
in Italy to unravel i) the epidemic virus population diversity, ii) the evolution of virus pathogenicity, 29 
and iii) the pathways of viral transmission between different holdings and sheds. We show a high 30 
level of genetic diversity of the HPAI H7N7 viruses within a single farm as a consequence of 31 
separate bottlenecks and founder effects. In particular, we identified the co-circulation in the index 32 
case of two viral strains showing a different insertion at the Hemagglutinin cleavage site, as well as 33 
nine nucleotide differences at the consensus level and 92 minority variants. To assess inter-farm 34 
transmission, we combined epidemiological and genetic data and identified the index case as the 35 
major source of the virus, suggesting the spread of different viral haplotypes from the index farm to 36 
the other industrial holdings, probably at different time points. Our results revealed inter-farm 37 
transmission dynamics that the epidemiological data alone could not unravel and demonstrated that 38 
delay in the disease detection and stamping out was the major cause of the emergence and the 39 
spread of the HPAI strain.  40 
 41 
 42 
IMPORTANCE 43 
The within and between host evolutionary dynamics of a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 44 
strain during a naturally occurring epidemic is currently poorly understood. Here, we perform for 45 
the first time an in-depth sequence analysis of all the samples collected during a HPAI epidemic 46 
and demonstrate the importance to complement outbreak investigations with genetic data to 47 
reconstruct the transmission dynamics of the viruses and to evaluate the within and between farms 48 
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genetic diversity of the viral population. We show that the evolutionary transition from the low 49 
pathogenic to the highly pathogenic form occurred within the first infected flock where we 50 
identified haplotypes with hemagglutinin cleavage site of different lengths. We also identify the 51 
index case as the major source of virus, indicating that prompt application of depopulation measures 52 
is essential to limit virus spread to other farms.  53 
  54 
 4 
INTRODUCTION 55 
Today, Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) techniques allow the investigation of viral 56 
population dynamics at any level (from within host to the epidemiological scale) with high 57 
resolution. In addition, NGS can be used to identify low frequency variants, which may be selected 58 
for and transmitted to other hosts. Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) exist in the host as populations of 59 
genetically related variants (1). The rate at which genetic diversity is generated within the host, the 60 
competitive replication ability of each variant, and the occurrence of genetic drift and of bottleneck 61 
events are some of the processes that drive virus evolution.  62 
NGS has been applied to avian influenza virus i) to characterize the emergence of mutations in 63 
the viral subpopulations associated to an increased virulence (2, 3) or to adaptation to new hosts, (4, 64 
5) ii) to study genetic bottlenecks upon transmission events (6, 7); iii) to investigate the dynamics of 65 
virus evolution during outbreaks in poultry (8); and iv) to identify co-infection with different 66 
subtypes (9). However, application of high throughput sequencing for the exploration of avian 67 
influenza virus evolution and transmission during a naturally occurring epidemic is still limited, 68 
making the interpretation of genomic data collected from outbreaks far from straightforward. 69 
Between August 13th and September 3rd of 2013, thirteen years after the last highly pathogenic 70 
avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak, Italy experienced a new avian influenza epidemic caused by a 71 
HPAI virus of the H7N7 subtype, which infected five industrial poultry holdings, four of which 72 
belonged to a large vertically integrated layer company, and one backyard flock (10). Detailed 73 
information on these outbreaks has been provided in a previous study (10). The epidemiological 74 
investigation indicated that the contact between free-range hens and wild waterfowl in the first 75 
affected holding may have favoured the introduction of a low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) 76 
virus, which rapidly mutated into a HP form within the infected sheds (10) through the acquisition 77 
of multiple basic amino acids at the hemagglutinin (HA) cleavage site, which is considered as being 78 
the major molecular determinant of an HPAI virus (11). 79 
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Here we used NGS to unravel the virus population diversity and the evolution of virus 80 
pathogenicity within the affected poultry farms. We also determined the transmission pathways of 81 
the H7N7 virus between different holdings and sheds during the course of the epidemic by 82 
combining deep sequencing and epidemiological data. 83 
 84 
 85 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 86 
 87 
Viruses 88 
Fourteen positive clinical samples (organs and swabs) were collected between August 13th and 89 
September 3rd 2013 from each infected shed of the five industrial farms and a backyard flock, 90 
counting for all the sheds infected during the epidemic (10). Epidemiological information, including 91 
collection date, sample type (swabs, organs), farm and shed of origin, number of birds present in 92 
each farm at the time of the forfeiture and depopulation date, is available in Table 1. 93 
The viral RNA copy numbers (Table 1) were determined for each sample using a quantitative real-94 
time RT-PCR assay with a standard curve targeting the M gene of influenza A, using the published 95 
probes and primers from Spackman et al. (12).  96 
 97 
Generation of viral sequence data 98 
Total RNA was purified from the 14 infected clinical samples using the Nucleospin RNA kit 99 
(Macherey–Nagel, Duren, Germany). Complete influenza A virus genomes were amplified with the 100 
SuperScript III One-Step RT-PCR system with Platinum Taq High Fidelity (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, 101 
CA) using one pair of primers complementary to the conserved elements of the influenza A virus 102 
promoter as described in (13). PCR products were visualized on a 0.7% agarose gel. Sequencing 103 
libraries were obtained using Nextera DNA XT Sample preparation kit (Illumina) following the 104 
manufacturer’s instructions and quantified using the Qubit dsDNA High Sensitivity kit (Invitrogen, 105 
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USA). The average fragment length was determined using the Agilent High Sensitivity Bioanalyzer 106 
Kit. Finally the indexed libraries were pooled in equimolar concentrations and sequenced in 107 
multiplex for 250 bp paired-end on Illumina MiSeq, according to the manufacturer’s instructions. 108 
 109 
Quality trimming, assembly and SNP detection 110 
Illumina MiSeq reads were inspected using FASTQC to assess the quality of data. Fastq files were 111 
cleaned with PRINSEQ and Trim Galore to remove low quality bases at the 5’ and 3’end of each 112 
read and to exclude reads with a Phred quality score below 30 and shorter than 80 nucleotides. The 113 
filtered, trimmed reads were aligned to the eight gene segments of A/chicken/Italy/13VIR4727-114 
11/2013, for which the consensus genome were previously obtained using Sanger method (data not 115 
shown), using BWA-MEM v.0.7.5a (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.3997v2). The BAM alignment files 116 
were parsed using the diversiTools program (http://josephhughes.github.io/btctools/) to determine 117 
the average base-calling error probability and to identify the frequency of polymorphisms at each 118 
site relative to the reference used for the alignment. In order to minimize artefacts introduced 119 
through RT-PCR and sequencing errors, for all the analysis conducted throughout this study we 120 
considered only polymorphisms with a frequency above 2% identified in positions with a minimum 121 
coverage of 500. This choice was based on the comparison of data obtained from two technical 122 
replicates of three samples (4541-8, 4541-9, 4541-34), sequenced on two different Illumina 123 
sequencing machines (MiSeq), starting from two separate libraries obtained from the same 124 
extracted RNA. This threshold should guarantee the exclusion of 99.6% of the errors from our deep 125 
sequencing data (Fig. 1). For each replicate, only the aligned genome with the highest coverage was 126 
used in the following analyses.  127 
For each gene, we calculated the number of synonymous and non-synonymous polymorphisms 128 
present either at a consensus level or as subpopulations and normalized to the number of 129 
synonymous and non-synonymous sites in the coding regions. Significant differences between the 130 
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frequencies of the two types of mutation in the different genes were calculated using a two-way 131 
ANOVA. A value of P<0.05 was considered significant.  132 
 133 
Genetic distance, entropy and transmission tree 134 
We computed the genetic distance between the complete genome of all pairs of individuals (S1 and 135 
S2) using the following formula: 𝑑 =  1
𝑁
∑ (|𝑓𝑁𝑖=1 𝐴𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑓𝐴𝑖𝑖2| + |𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖2| + |𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖2| +136 |𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖2|)2, where fAiS1, fCiS1, fTiS1, fGiS1 are the frequencies of nucleotide A, C, T and G at 137 
position i in the two samples and N is the length of the sequence. This matrix was used to compute 138 
a neighbour-joining phylogenetic tree using the web server T-REX (14). In addition, we combined 139 
the distance matrix and the collection dates to reconstruct the transmission tree of the H7N7 during 140 
the Italian outbreak, using SeqTrack (15), a graph-based approach particularly suitable to infer 141 
maximum parsimony genealogies of viruses in densely sampled disease outbreak. The adegenet 142 
(16) and igraph packages (17) for the R software were used to perform the analysis and to draw the 143 
network. 144 
To measure the complexity of the viral populations within a sample, we calculated the Shannon 145 
entropy of each sample and each gene using the following equation: 146 
𝐸 =  − 1
𝑁
� (𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑁
𝑖=1
ln𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖𝑖 ln𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖𝑖 ln 𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖𝑖 ln𝑓𝑖𝑖)  
where 𝑓𝑖 is the frequency of the nucleotide A, T, G or C at position i and N is the total length of the 147 
gene segment (average entropy per gene) or of the genome (average entropy per sample). Only 148 
nucleotides with a frequency above the 2% threshold identified in positions with a minimum 149 
coverage of 500 were included in this calculation. We used one-way ANOVA to determine 150 
significant differences between the entropies of each gene for each sample. A value of P<0.05 was 151 
considered significant.  152 
 153 
Phylogenetic analyses 154 
 8 
Consensus sequences of the complete genome of the 14 samples were aligned using MAFFT v. 7 155 
(18) and compared with the most related sequences available in GenBank and in GISAID (accessed 156 
on May 2015). In addition, representative H7 viruses circulating in wild and domestic birds in 157 
Europe and H7 viruses responsible of important epidemics were included in the alignment. 158 
Maximum likelihood (ML) phylogenetic trees were obtained for each gene segment using the best-159 
fit general time reversible (GTR) model of nucleotide substitution with gamma-distributed rate 160 
variation among sites (with four rate categories, Γ4) available in RAxML-MPI v.8.1.7 (19). To 161 
assess the robustness of individual nodes of the phylogeny, one hundred bootstrap replicates were 162 
performed. Phylogenetic trees were visualized with the program FigTree v1.4 163 
(http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/). 164 
The eight gene segments of the influenza virus genome were manually concatenated and the 165 
alignment was used to construct a phylogenetic network using the Median Joining method 166 
implemented in the program NETWORK 4.5 (http://www.fluxus-engineering.com) (20). This 167 
method uses a parsimony approach to reconstruct the relationships between highly similar 168 
sequences, and allows the creation of “median vectors”, which represents unsampled sequences, 169 
that are used to connect the existing genotypes in the most parsimonious way. The parameter 170 
epsilon was set to 10 and the transition to transversion ratio to 3:1. A bootstrap resampling process 171 
(1000 replicates) using a distance-based method (NeighborNet) implemented in SplitsTree4 172 
v.4.14.2 (21) was used to assess the robustness of the network edges.  173 
 174 
Nucleotide sequence accession numbers 175 
MiSeq sequences were submitted to the NCBI Sequence Read Archive (SRA, 176 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Traces/sra/) under accession numbers SRR3036850, SRR3036852, 177 
SRR3036854, SRR3036856, SRR3036860, SRR3036864, SRR3036910, SRR3036911, 178 
SRR3036914, SRR3036916, SRR3036917, SRR3036919, SRR3036920, SRR3036945. Consensus 179 
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sequences of the 14 H7N7 viruses were submitted to GISAID under accession numbers EPI677984 180 
to EPI678095. 181 
 182 
 183 
RESULTS 184 
Phylogenetic analysis of consensus sequences 185 
To investigate influenza virus variation during the HPAI H7N7 epidemic, we sequenced the eight 186 
genomic segments for all the clinical samples received from each infected farm. The highest 187 
number of positive samples (8) was submitted from the three infected sheds (shed 2, 4 and 5) of the 188 
index case, while only one sample per infected shed was received from the remaining five outbreak 189 
sites, for a total of one or two samples per farm. Farms are labelled from 1 to 6, according to the 190 
collection date of the samples. Details of location, date of sample collection, farm characteristics, 191 
sample type and mean depth of coverage are reported in Table 1.  192 
 193 
Our maximum likelihood phylogenetic analyses of the consensus sequences show that the fourteen 194 
HPAI H7N7 viruses form a distinct genetic group, defined by high bootstrap values (>96%) and 195 
long branches in all the eight phylogenies, suggesting the occurrence of a single viral introduction 196 
(Fig 2). This group includes also the sequences of the complete genome available for one of the 197 
three poultry workers involved in the depopulation, who developed conjunctivitis due to HPAI 198 
H7N7 infection, suggesting a direct transmission of the virus from poultry to human (22). In the HA 199 
and NA phylogenetic trees, the Italian H7N7 HPAI cluster with H7 viruses collected in Europe 200 
between 2009 and 2014. In particular, the HA gene segment of the Italian samples show the highest 201 
similarity (99.1-99.3%) with an LPAI H7N7 virus collected from a wild bird in Italy in 2014, for 202 
which only the HA sequence is available (Fig 2), while the NA gene segment display the highest 203 
identity (99-99.1%) with an H7N7 virus collected from chicken in the Netherlands (phylogenetic 204 
tree is available upon request). In the phylogenies of the internal gene segments the Italian samples 205 
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group with viruses of different subtypes circulating mainly among wild birds in Eurasian countries 206 
(phylogenetic trees are available upon request).  207 
 208 
High genetic variability of the first infected flock 209 
Surprisingly, molecular analysis of the eight viruses collected from the index case shows the co-210 
circulation of two highly pathogenic strains with a different insertion at the HA cleavage site 211 
compared to a H7 LP virus. Specifically, sequences of the two viruses from shed 5 (4541-9 and 212 
4541-34) show an insertion of 6 nucleotides, while the remaining samples identified in sheds 2 and 213 
4 possess a longer cleavage site with a nine nucleotide insertion (Fig. 3).  214 
To better understand the evolution of the pathogenicity of the H7N7 viruses within the first infected 215 
flock, we focused our analysis on the deep sequencing data of the HA cleavage site. The sequencing 216 
coverage in this genetic region ranges from 4445 for the sample 4541-7 to 23511 for the sample 217 
4541-34. We did not identify any reads showing the cleavage site typical of a LPAI strain. 99.9% of 218 
the reads of the two samples from shed 5 (named for clarity V+6) possess a cleavage site with an 219 
insertion of six nucleotides, with only a few reads containing an insertion of three, five and nine 220 
nucleotides (Table 2). 99.7% to 99.9% of the reads of viruses from shed 2 (named V+9) have an 221 
insertion of nine nucleotides, with only a few minority variants showing an insertion of six, seven 222 
or eight nucleotides (Table 2). On the other hand, in one of the samples from shed 4 (4541-33) we 223 
identified a mixed population with both type of cleavage sites displaying an insertion of nine 224 
(95.7%) and six (4.1%) nucleotides. 225 
Similarly to the samples from shed 2, the majority (from 99.9% to 100%) of the viral population of 226 
the subsequent outbreaks possesses the longer cleavage site, suggesting that this variant (V+9) may 227 
have a higher fitness advantage (Fig. 3). 228 
Besides the cleavage site, the samples V+9 collected from shed 2 and 4 of the first infected farm 229 
can be distinguished from the two samples from shed 5 by nine nucleotide signatures (HA G471A, 230 
PB2 A347G and T1891G, PA A347G and T1891G, NP G219A and C316A, NS1 G353A and 231 
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G378A; Fig. 3), which resulted in three amino acid changes (PA Q116R, PA C631G, NS1 R118K). 232 
These signatures are maintained in all samples identified in the subsequent outbreaks, suggesting 233 
that only viruses from sheds 2 and 4 of the index case were transmitted to the other five farms (Fig 234 
3). In addition, we identified one non-synonymous mutation at position 130 of the M2 gene, 235 
responsible of the amino acid substitution D44N, which is shared between the V+6 viruses and the 236 
samples 4527-11 from shed 2 of farm 1, 4603 from farm 2, 4678 from farm 3 and 5091 from farm 5 237 
(Fig 3). However, whether this mutation emerged by chance in the 4 viruses or arose in the shed 2 238 
virus of the index case and was then transmitted to the other outbreaks or was acquired by the V+9 239 
samples through a reassortment event cannot be assessed.  240 
To determine whether the shed 5 viruses (V+6) were the progenitors of the variant V+9, we 241 
examined the presence of the nine signature mutations (Fig 3) as minority variants in the analysed 242 
samples. None of the mutations typical of the V+9 viruses were already present in shed 5 viruses 243 
(V+6) with a frequency higher than 2% (the frequency threshold used in this study, see the 244 
Materials and Methods section for details). Similarly, none of the mutations characteristic of V+6 245 
(Fig 3) was identified in the subpopulations of the V+9 samples, except for the virus from shed 4 of 246 
the index case (4541-33), which, besides the shorter cleavage site, possessed subpopulations 247 
containing all the mutations distinctive of V+6 variant, with a frequency ranging from 3% to 9%, 248 
confirming the presence of a mixed population (V+6 and V+9). 249 
 250 
Genetic diversity of H7N7 viruses 251 
Overall, we observed mutations at 185 sites (excluding the HA cleavage site) distributed among the 252 
eight gene segments, of which 111 are non-synonymous and 74 synonymous. Specifically, a total of 253 
35 consensus-level nucleotide substitutions are recovered along the entire genome, defining 11 254 
different genomes (named from A to K in Fig 3), five of which identified within the first infected 255 
farm (A to E). The PB2 gene, with a total of ten nucleotide variants (8 synonymous and 2 non-256 
synonymous), is the segment showing the highest number of mutations at the consensus level. The 257 
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nucleotide distance among the fourteen viruses ranged from 0-0.1% for the PA, HA and NA genes 258 
to 0-0.2% for the PB2, PB1, NP genes and 0-0.4% for the NS gene. Notably, 13 out of 35 mutations 259 
distributed along twelve proteins (HA, NA, PB2, PB1, PB1-F2, PA, PA-X, NP, M1, M2, NS1 and 260 
NS2) are non-synonymous, with the PA protein showing the highest number of amino acid 261 
variations (4) (Fig 3).  262 
Besides these consensus-level variant sites, our deep sequencing analysis identifies 209 minority 263 
variants in 151 sites (97 non-synonymous and 54 synonymous) with a frequency ranging from 2% 264 
to 49.8% (Fig 4). The virus collected from shed 4 of the index case (4541-33), which displayed a 265 
mixed population of V+6 and V+9, and the sample 4603 collected from farm 2, comprise the 266 
highest number of minority variants (respectively, 40 and 41). On the contrary, we did not detect 267 
any subpopulations in the samples 4541-34 and 4541-9. No correlation between the number of 268 
variants and the type of samples used for the analysis (pool, organs or swab) was observed (Pearson 269 
test, p-value=0.254; r=0.33). 270 
We measured the complexity of the viral population of each sample using Shannon entropy 271 
(represented by the size of the circles in Fig 5). In the first infected flock, entropy measures 272 
fluctuate considerably: the lowest values are observed for the two viruses from the shed 5 (V+6) 273 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-values range from 9.37 X 10-14 to 4.7 X 10-3), suggesting that these 274 
samples (4541-9 and 4541-34) had recently experienced a narrow bottleneck and had not recovered 275 
from the loss of complexity. Conversely, viruses from shed 2 show intermediate values of entropy, 276 
while samples 4541-33 from shed 4 of the index case, 4603 from farm 2 and 4678 from farm 3 277 
displayed entropy levels significantly higher compared to the other samples (Wilcoxon rank-sum 278 
test, p-values range from 9.37 X 10-14 to 1.49 X 10-3), consistent with the high genetic diversity 279 
observed across their genomes. There is no significant Pearson correlation between within-host 280 
virus diversity and viral RNA content (p-value=0.487; r=-0.2; the number of RNA copies are 281 
reported in Table 1). Thus, the significantly different entropies between the analysed samples may 282 
be simply a bias associated to the time elapsed between infection and sampling, or alternatively 283 
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they may be due to the occurrence of random or selective bottleneck events of different intensity 284 
within separate sheds or farms. 285 
To evaluate which could be the major force - selective bottleneck or random founder effect - 286 
driving the virus evolution, we compared the relative diversity changes on a gene-by-gene basis 287 
(Table S1). We would not expect selective bottlenecks to affect all the genes in the same way and 288 
thus the entropy and the number of non-synonymous mutations found in the genes should vary. To 289 
this aim we calculated the mean entropy and the number of synonymous and non-synonymous 290 
normalised mutations separately for all the genes of each sample (Table S1). There was no 291 
significant difference in the entropy between the genes (one-way ANOVA, p=0.196) or between the 292 
number of non-synonymous and synonymous mutations (two-way ANOVA, p=0.249), suggesting 293 
that the reduction in diversity observed in the analysed samples was probably due to founder effects 294 
rather than selective bottlenecks. 295 
 296 
Minority variants transmitted between sheds and farms 297 
Focusing our analysis of the first infected flock, we observed that only a few mutations were shared 298 
at a shed and farm level, while the majority of the minor changes were unique to individual 299 
samples. Specifically, at the shed level we detected 44 minority changes in viruses from shed 2, of 300 
which 22 are found in individual samples and not shared with others, and 48 in viruses from shed 4, 301 
of which 37 are identified in single samples. Similarly, at the farm scale we counted 92 mutations, 302 
of which 12 are shared between 2-4 samples, while 59 minority variants were identified in single 303 
individuals (Fig 4). 304 
Interestingly, five of these variants, shared between viruses of the first infected farm, are fixed in 305 
the viral population of at least one sample (variants highlighted with black arrows in Fig 4) and 306 
three of them were also transmitted or independently acquired by viruses collected from the other 307 
premises. Four of these are non-synonymous mutations fixed in the viral population, which cause 308 
changes at the protein level (NS M119T, M2 D44N, PA V100I, PB2 K574R) (Fig 3). 309 
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We detected only seven minority variants (HA 1351A, M 942G, M 955G, PA 1251 G, PA 1748A, 310 
PB2 981G and NA 390A) shared between two or three farms. Interestingly, five of them result in 311 
amino acid mutations (HA D451N, M2 D85G, PA R583Q, PB2 G327G, NA M130I). These non-312 
synonymous mutations may be advantageous variants, associated with changes in viral fitness or 313 
due to adaptive evolution of the virus, or alternatively they may be neutral or deleterious 314 
polymorphisms, which occurred because of random genetic drift or hitchhiking.  315 
 316 
Transmission dynamics of the H7N7 virus 317 
To assess the inter-farm transmission, a Median Joining phylogenetic network was inferred using 318 
the concatenated consensus sequences of the eight gene segments of the 14 analysed viruses (Fig 6). 319 
Within the first infected farm we identified five sequence genotypes (grey circles): one within shed 320 
5, two within shed 2, and two in shed 4. Viruses from sheds 2 and 4 appear to be at the origin of the 321 
infection to the other farms, although one or two median vectors (red circles), which represent the 322 
lost ancestral sequences, separate them from viruses of the other holdings, except for the sample 323 
5051-3 from farm 6, which appears to be a direct descendant of shed 2 viruses (bootstrap value 324 
85.5). Sequences from farms 2 to 6 grouped within two main clusters which shared a common 325 
ancestor (c1 and c2): c1 includes viruses collected from farms 2 (4603), 3 (4778) and 5 (5091), 326 
while c2 contains virus sequences from farms 4 (4774) and 6 (5051-1). Sequences within these two 327 
clusters are separated by 6 to 10 nucleotide differences, whereas 9-13 differences are observed 328 
between viruses of the two clusters. Therefore, the high number of mutations and median vectors 329 
identified between the analysed samples and the low number of viruses available for the analysis 330 
makes the relationship between sequences hard to determine and we cannot exclude that sampling 331 
bias may have affected the results. Our deep sequencing data may contribute to better understand 332 
this relationship. To this aim, first we inferred a neighbour-joining phylogenetic tree based on the 333 
distance matrix calculated from our NGS data, which confirmed the clustering identified by our 334 
network analysis (Fig 4). Then we used the distance matrix and the collection dates to reconstruct a 335 
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transmission tree using the graph-based algorithm SeqTrack. This approach, which considers the 336 
sampled viruses as a fraction of the genealogy, is particularly suitable to infer the transmission 337 
pathway during disease outbreaks, where one strain can be the ancestor of another strain (Fig 5).  338 
Despite 21 days passing from the first to the last outbreak, the inferred genealogy suggests that all 339 
but one of the outbreaks descend directly from shed 2 (V+9) of the index case. The only exception 340 
is represented by the virus (5091) collected from the backyard farm on September 2 (farm 5), which 341 
appears to have been infected directly by farm 3. 342 
However, based on the number of shared mutations between the analysed sequences, we may 343 
speculate further scenarios. For example, sample 4603 from farm 2 shared two fixed mutations with 344 
samples 4678 (farm 3) and 5091 (farm 5) (group c2 of the network analysis), thus a transmission 345 
event from farm 2 to farm 3 cannot be excluded. Similarly, viruses 4774 and 5051-1 share 3 unique 346 
minority variants and 1 unique fixed mutation, making a transmission event between these two 347 
farms highly plausible. In addition, samples 4774 and 5051-1 share 1 fixed mutations and 3 348 
minority variants (group c1 of the network analysis), and in turn they share 2 fixed mutations with 349 
the sample 5051-3. Although viruses 5051-1 and 5051-3 were collected from two different sheds of 350 
farm 6, we observed a relatively high nucleotide distance between them. Specifically, they show 7 351 
and 14 nucleotide differences at the population and subpopulation level, respectively, although all 352 
the consensus level mutations were present as minority variants in the other sample (Fig 4). Thus, 353 
the occurrence of two separate introductions in farm 6 from the index case and/or farm 4 cannot be 354 
excluded. 355 
Overall, these analyses indicate that shed 2 of the index case is the major source of the virus. An 356 
early strain (c1) appears to have spread from the first infected flock to farm 2 (19 August) and 3 (21 357 
August) and then from farm 3 to the backyard farm 5 (2 September). Since farms 2 and 3 belong to 358 
different companies (circle outlines in Fig 5) and are located 50 Km apart (map in Fig 6), it is more 359 
plausible that viruses with similar genetic characteristics were transmitted from the index case to 360 
both holdings. A later spread with a slightly different strain (c2) may have occurred from the first 361 
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infected flock to farm 4 (27 August) and 6 (3 September). These two farms are located in the same 362 
area, with a distance of 3 Km, and belong to the same layer company as the first infected holding, 363 
thus an exchange of virus between them cannot be ruled out.  364 
 365 
 366 
DISCUSSION 367 
Acquisition of a virulent phenotype by H7 avian influenza viruses may have devastating 368 
consequences to the poultry industry and in some instance can create major human health issues, 369 
including the risk of generating a new pandemic strain (23). Despite the identification of multiple 370 
basic amino acids at the HA cleavage site as one of the most important molecular markers of virus 371 
pathogenicity, the mechanisms underlying the emergence, spread and evolution of HPAI during an 372 
epidemic are poorly understood and limited to few studies (3, 24). Here we performed for the first 373 
time a deep sequencing analysis of all the samples collected during a HPAI epidemic to evaluate the 374 
transmission dynamics and the within and between farms genetic diversity of the viral population.  375 
We showed that the fourteen H7N7 Italian samples collected from six different farms form a cluster 376 
distinct to other Eurasian sequences for all the eight gene segments, suggesting the occurrence in 377 
the poultry population of a single viral introduction. The high similarity of the HA gene segment 378 
with a virus collected from a wild bird in Italy and the contact between free-range hens and wild 379 
waterfowl in the first infected farm (10), indicates that the LPAI progenitor strain may have been 380 
introduced from the wild bird population into the first infected holding, where it rapidly mutated 381 
into a HP form.  382 
Despite our phylogenies suggesting a single viral introduction, we observed a high genetic 383 
variability of H7N7 between the different sheds of the first infected flock. In particular, at the 384 
consensus level, viruses collected from shed 5 possessed a shorter HA cleavage site and nine 385 
nucleotide differences compared to the viruses from sheds 2. None of the fixed mutations had ever 386 
been described in previous HPAI H7 outbreaks or recognized as associated to a specific phenotypic 387 
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effect. Further studies will be necessary to evaluate their possible impact on virus fitness, host range 388 
and virulence. This number of nucleotide substitutions (9) is not compatible with the occurrence of 389 
different introductions, when a higher number of mutations is usually observed (25). Moreover, we 390 
noticed that the highest genetic distance (mean ± standard error) between the two groups of H7N7 391 
viruses (V+6 and V+9) ranged from 0.1% ± 0.1% for the HA, NA and PA genes to 0.4% ± 0.2% for 392 
the NS gene, while, the overall mean distance among the sequences included in our phylogenies 393 
ranged from 1.8% ± 0.2% for the M gene to 5.5% ± 0.3% for the NA gene. This evidence indicates 394 
that the Italian H7N7 sequences are significantly closer to each other than any other random 395 
sequences in their tree seems to be, which supports the hypothesis that the two variants V+6 and 396 
V+9 had very likely derived from a single introduction. Hence, this high genetic variability can be 397 
explained by i) a rapid evolution of the virus following some bottleneck events or a strong selection, 398 
ii) independent evolution of the same virus within two separate sheds, or iii) the establishment of 399 
the infection starting from two different seeding variants  from the same progenitor viral population 400 
comprising a cloud of diverse viruses. Nevertheless, our analysis of the mutation spectra of viral 401 
populations suggests that the two variants arose as a consequence of a founder event or a narrow 402 
population bottleneck. Indeed, the haplotype V+6, circulating in shed 5, was not identified in the 403 
viral subpopulations of shed 2 and similarly haplotype V+9, identified in shed 2, was not detected 404 
as a minority population in shed 5 animals. In addition, at the HA cleavage site of viruses from 405 
sheds 2 (V+9) and 5 (V+6) we identified only a total of 16 and 3 reads with an insertion 406 
respectively of six and nine nucleotides.  407 
Entropy values obtained for the two viruses from shed 5 further supports this hypothesis. Samples 408 
founded by few viral particles should have low entropy, since the strong bottleneck/founder effect 409 
drastically reduce the diversity of the viral population. On the other hand, samples that experienced 410 
relatively loose bottlenecks should display higher entropy. Therefore, the low entropy values of the 411 
viruses from shed 5 may indicate that they had recently experienced a narrow bottleneck/founder 412 
effect or that they had been subjected to a strong selection which had reduced the within-host 413 
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diversity and fixed adaptive mutations. To distinguish between selective and random 414 
bottlenecks/founder effects we compared the relative diversity changes on a gene-by-gene basis. 415 
We showed that there were no significant differences between the entropy values and the number of 416 
non-synonymous mutations for the different genes, suggesting that founder effects caused by the 417 
transmission bottlenecks are a major driving force of virus evolution during this epidemic. 418 
On the other hand, viruses from shed 2 show intermediate entropy values, suggesting that i) they 419 
were founded by a larger seeding population, ii) they experienced a high-level of replication, or iii) 420 
they had circulated within the shed for a longer period of time. The latter suggestion is supported by 421 
the identification of H7-specific antibodies in animals from this shed, but not in animals from sheds 422 
4 and 5 (10), while the second hypothesis may be supported by the high number of dead birds found 423 
in shed 2 compared to the other sheds, considering the virulence of the two variants were equal 424 
(intravenous pathogenicity index of 3 for both variants, data not shown). 425 
However, we cannot exclude that difference in the within-host genetic diversity between the 426 
analysed samples could be associated to a different time of sampling since infection. Unfortunately, 427 
the lack of information on the exact time of entrance of the virus in each farm and shed makes it 428 
impossible to exclude this possible bias and to ascertain the process responsible of the reduction of 429 
the genetic variability, which may be caused both by bottlenecks of different sizes that occurred 430 
around the same time since infection or by similar bottlenecks that occurred at different time points 431 
relative to sampling. 432 
Surely, sequences of early viruses might have helped us to provide a better characterization of the 433 
evolution of this strain within the index case. Indeed, the identification of H7-specific antibodies in 434 
animals from shed 2 and from the outer sheds 1 and 7, where no viruses were isolated (10), 435 
indicates that the virus had been circulating undetected within the farm before its identification, 436 
likely with a low pathogenic phenotype. 437 
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Moreover, the identification of three human infections during this epidemic highlights the need for 438 
constant monitoring during avian influenza outbreaks for the emergence in poultry of amino acid 439 
signatures associated with interspecies transmission to provide early warning of pandemic potential. 440 
 441 
Our analysis of the transmission dynamics indicates that only one of the two variants (V+9), 442 
probably the one with the highest fitness advantage, was transmitted from the index case to the 443 
other farms. Four out of the six infected farms (farms 1, 2, 4, 6) belong to one large vertically 444 
integrated layer company (Fig 5), therefore virus dissemination might have occurred through shared 445 
equipment, human-mediated mechanical transport, and also through infected workers, as H7N7 446 
virus was diagnosed for three humans involved in the control of the epidemic (22). The low number 447 
of shared mutations between farms (seven) suggests that the transmission depended on the 448 
dissemination of a few viral particles.  However, the high frequency threshold (2%) used in this 449 
study to identify the minority variants and the scarce number of analysed samples for each farm 450 
need to be taken into consideration.  451 
In the farms for which it was possible to sequence more than one sample (eight for farm 1 and two 452 
for farm 6), we identified the co-circulation in the same premise of different related variants and the 453 
possible occurrence of multiple introductions in the same holdings (i.e. farm 6), which can be 454 
detected only through the sequencing of a larger number of samples. Moreover, the high number of 455 
median vectors identified between the analysed samples in our phylogenetic network reveals 456 
missing ancestral sequences from our analyses, which might have been detected with increased 457 
sampling. As a consequence, increasing the number of viruses sampled from each farm and also 458 
from the environment could increase the resolution of our inter-farm transmission dynamic.  459 
We identify farm 1 as the major source for the spread of the virus to the other four industrial 460 
holdings, while the rural farm (farm 5) appears to have received the virus from the turkey farm 461 
(farm 3). Interestingly, this finding allowed the National authorities to demonstrate the occurrence 462 
of uncontrolled movements of birds from the infected turkey flock (farm 3), underlining the 463 
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importance of genetic data to complement the outbreak investigation. Despite 21 days elapsing 464 
from the index case (August 13) to the last outbreak (September 3), the late depopulation date of the 465 
first infected flock (August 27) and the ability of the avian virus to persist in the environment (26), 466 
might explain the virus spread between these two holdings (1 and 6).  467 
In addition, results of our analysis of the transmission dynamics suggests that, despite farm 2 being 468 
located in close proximity to farms 4 and 6, transmission links are absent between these two 469 
premises. On the contrary, the virus sampled from this farm appears to be more related to the virus 470 
from farms 1 and 3, located, respectively, 38 km and 36 km from farm 2.   471 
This finding suggests that multiple introductions of different viral haplotypes occurred from farm 1 472 
to the other farms, probably at different time points and with different transmission modes, i.e. 473 
neighbourhood spread (i.e. farm 1 and 3), human-mediated transport among farms of the same 474 
company (i.e. farm 1 and 2 or farm 1 and 4). These different means of viral diffusion have been 475 
observed also during other HPAI epidemics (24, 27) suggesting that long distance transmission 476 
events may play an important role for the virus dissemination into new areas. 477 
Overall this study shows that analysis of deep sequencing data can complement epidemiological 478 
investigations, providing important insights and revealing unexpected dynamics on the inter-farm 479 
transmission network. Specifically, we demonstrated that the delay in the disease detection and 480 
stamping out in the index case might have been the major cause of the emergence and the spread of 481 
the HPAI strain. Epidemiological investigations did not recognize the central role of the first 482 
infected flock in the diffusion of the virus to most of the farms, and suggested an epidemiological 483 
link between farms 2, 5 and 6, which has not been confirmed by our data. In addition the 484 
epidemiological data alone was not sufficient to trace back the source of the virus detected in the 485 
rural farm (farm 5), which we demonstrated to be linked to the turkey farm (farm 3). 486 
Moreover, we show that a farm can harbour a high level of heterogeneity, potentially caused either 487 
by separate bottlenecks and founder effects in the different sheds, or by multiple viral introductions 488 
from different sources. Hence, the importance during the control activities to collect and analyse 489 
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several samples from each infected farm to provide a complete picture of the evolutionary process 490 
during an avian influenza epidemic. 491 
 492 
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Table 1. Epidemiological information of the 14 samples collected during the HPAI H7N7 outbreak (TS= tracheal swabs). 
Farm Sample RNA copies/µl 
Mean depth 
of coverage Sample type Farm type 
Collection 
date Province 
Number 
of birds 
Depopulation 
date 
1 
shed 2 
4527-11 1,24E+05 19354 Pool of 10 TS 
Laying hen 
(industrial farm) 13 Aug 2013 Ferrara 128000 27 Aug 2013 
4527-12 9,22E+07 36772 Pool of 10 TS 
4541-7 1,04E+06 24696 Organ pool* 
4541-32 2,49E+07 53292 Kidney 
1 
shed 4 
4541-8 5,24E+05 34018 Organ pool* 
4541-33 4,98E+03 42661 Kidney 
1 
shed 5 
4541-9 3,93E+04 23390 Organ pool* 
4541-34 4,32E+04 58893 Kidney 
2 4603-1 2,89E+05 43810 Pool of 10 TS Laying hen (industrial farm) 19 Aug 2013 Bologna 584900 8 Sept 2013 
3 4678 7,88E+05 19893 Organ pool* Meat turkey (industrial farm) 21 Aug 2013 Ferrara 19850 27 Aug 2013 
4 4774 2,30E+08 31804 Organ pool** Laying hen (industrial farm) 27 Aug 2013 Bologna 121705 8 Sept 2013 
5 5091 1,21E+07 24510 Organ pool* Backyard flock 2 Sept 2013 Ferrara 3 5 Sept 2013 
6 5051-1 5,27E+07 46615 Trachea Pullets (industrial farm) 3 Sept 2013 Bologna 98200 8 Sept 2013 5051-3 1,02E+08 48562 Trachea * pool of organs from 2 animals ** pool of organs from 3 animals
 27 
Table 2. Number of reads showing a 0 to 9 nucleotide insertion (compared to the sequence of a H7 
LPAI strain, CCAAAGAGAAGA) at the HA cleavage site of the eight samples collected from 
three different sheds of the index case 
 
N. nt 
insertion 
SHED 5 SHED 4 SHED 2 
4541-34 4541-9 4541-8 4541-33 4527-11 4527-12 4541-7 4541-32 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 23509 14861 0 591 11 0 1 4 
7 0 0 4 18 5 3 5 27 
8 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
9 2 1 16587 13700 6660 13725 4439 22929 
 
 
FIGURE LEGENDS 
Fig 1. Distribution of nucleotide frequency differences between three technical replicates. . For 
each genome position with coverage >500 the frequency differences between the four bases (A, C, 
T and G) were obtained from the comparison of the replicates of the threes samples: 4541-8 in 
yellow, 4541-9 in violet, 4541-34 in blue. The y-axis represents the percentage of nucleotide 
positions where the highest frequency differences fall within the ranges 0-0.1%, 0.1-0.25%, 0.25-
0.5%, 0.5-1%, 1-2% and >2% (x-axis). Frequency differences higher than 2% were observed in 
only 0.3%-0.4% of all the analysed positions (11501 to 13308) for all the replicates. Thus a 2% 
threshold allows the exclusion of 99.6% of the possible errors. 
 
Fig 2. ML phylogenetic tree of the HA gene segment of 172 H7 avian influenza viruses. HPAI 
H7N7 viruses collected during Italian epidemic are coloured according to the farm of collection: 
grey for farm 1, purple for farm 2, light blue for farm 3, yellow for farm 4, green for farm 5 and 
orange for farm 6. The numbers at nodes represent bootstrap values (>70%), while branch lengths 
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are scaled according to the numbers of nucleotide substitutions per site. The tree is mid-point rooted 
for clarity only. 
 
Fig 3. Consensus level nucleotide and amino acid differences among the complete genome of 
the 14 Italian H7N7 viruses. Each sample (column) is coloured according to the farm of 
collection: grey for farm 1, purple for farm 2, light blue for farm 3, yellow for farm 4, green for 
farm 5 and orange for farm 6. The farm and shed of belonging (i.e. 1-shed 5, corresponds to farm 1, 
shed 5) and the sample type is indicated above the sample name. The nucleotide (NT) differences 
identified between each sample and the viruses from shed 5 of the index case (samples 4541-9 and 
4541-34, column 1 and 2) are reported. Amino acid mutations (AA) are highlighted in red, while 
silent mutations are in black. The 11 different genomes identified during this epidemic are indicated 
in the last row (A to K). 
 
Fig 4. Heat-map of the nucleotide frequency. The horizontal axis represents the samples, 
coloured according to the farm of collection, while the vertical axis display only the variable 
nucleotide positions showing nucleotide differences compared to the samples 4541-9 and 4541-34. 
The colour scale represents the nucleotide frequency according to the scale bar at the top of the 
figure. White spaces represent positions for which deep sequencing data were not available 
(coverage <500).  Black arrows indicate the variants that are fixed in the viral population of at least 
one sample of the first infected farm. The dendrogram above the heatmap represents the neighbour-
joining tree obtained from the distance matrix calculated from the deep sequencing data.  
 
Fig 5. Transmission tree obtained from deep sequencing data. Each circle represents an 
individual sample, coloured according to the farm of collection. The size of the circles is 
proportional to the mean entropy value. The vertical axis represents the time of collection of each 
sample (samples in the same row belong to the same farm). Circle outlines are assigned accordingly 
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to the owner of the farm as shown in the figure legend. Connecting arrows correspond to the results 
obtained from SeqTrack, while dashed lines are alternative hypotheses of transmission events 
formulated based on the number of shared mutations. Numbers over the lines are the genetic 
distance calculated from the deep sequencing data between the samples. Coloured area represents 
genetic groups identified based on the number of shared mutations and the results of both the 
neighbour-joining phylogenetic tree (Fig 4) and the network analysis (Fig 6). 
 
Fig 6. Median-joining phylogenetic network. A) The network was constructed from the 
consensus sequences of the eight concatenated gene segments. Each unique sequence genotype is 
represented by a circle sized relatively to its frequency in the dataset. Numbers next to the circles 
correspond to the samples showing that particular genotype, while the number within the circle 
represents the shed where the genotype was identified. Genotypes are coloured according to farm. 
Branches represent the shortest trees and black circles represent the number of nucleotide mutations 
that separate each node. Median vectors are shown as red circles. The violet and yellow shading 
represent the two identified genetic groups C1 and C2. Numbers at each branch represent bootstrap 
values.   B) The map shows the geographic position of the six infected farms.  
